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Abstract- Wireless mesh networks (WMNs)
Abstract(WMNs) have emerged as a make loss recovery an essential component of the protocol,
promising technology for providing
providing low-cost
promising
low-cost community
community wireless while scarce network bandwidth resource demands keeping
services. Despite recent advancement
advancement in securing
securing wireless netnet- the overhead low to be a top priority in the protocol design.
services.
secure group
group communication
communication on wireless
works, the problem of secure
The secure group communication problem and the related
networks has received
received relatively little attention.
attention. Characteristics
Characteristics
networks
specific to WMNs, such as limited
limited communication
communication range and key management problem have also been studied for wireless
specific
high link error rate,
rate, raise unique challenges
challenges in designing
designing such sensor networks (WSNs) [7],
high
[7], [8],
[8], [9]
[91 and mobile ad hoc
protocols.
protocols.
[lo], [II],
[I 11, [12]. However, services for
networks (MANETs) [10],
focus on providing data confidentiality
confidentiality for
In this paper we focus
group communications
communications on WMNs. First, we propose
W-LKH, a WSNs or MANETs were designed to sustain severe computapropose W-LKH,
group
power, storage, mobility and energy constraints, and as a
protocol that combines
combines centralized
centralized key management
management and reliable
reliable tion power,
key delivery,
delivery, to address
address the less robust communication
communication present result, they have limited scalability and robustness. As WMNs
networks. Next, we introduce
introduce WSOM,
WSOM, a new protocol have less restrictive constraints, they create opportunities for
in wireless networks.
framework designed
designed specifically
specifically for the WMNs to overcome
overcome designing more scalable and robust protocols.
framework
limitations of W-LKH.
W-LKH. Simulation
Simulation
the performance and security limitations
In this paper, we focus
focus on the problem of ensuring data
protocols can provide good
results show that all of the proposed protocols
performance to the upper layer applications,
applications, while the WSOM confidentiality for group communications on WMNs. We conprotocols
responsive than sider single-source group applications where a single source
protocols incur smaller overhead and are more responsive
W-LKH. Finally,
Finally, we suggest
suggest the applicability
applicability of each of the disseminates data to a dynamically changing set of receivers.
W-LKH.
receivers.
proposed protocols
different application
application requirements.
requirements.
protocols under different
The main contributions of this paper are:

I. INTRODUCTION
1.

• We study the design space for secure group communication protocols on WMNs. We propose W-LKH, a centralized membership protocol that combines the well-known
protocol LKH [1]
[ l ] with reliable key delivery mechanisms,
and a new protocol framework WSOM with decentralized
membership management that overcomes the limitations
W-LKH.
inherent in W-LKH.
• We compare all the proposed protocols analytically by
examining the overhead and their responsiveness to the
upper layer applications.
• We validate our design experimentally with extensive
simulations based on the ns simulator [13].
[13]. Simulation
results show that all of the proposed protocols can provide
good performance to the upper layer applications, and
with proper optimization, the WSOM based protocols
incur less overhead and are more responsive than WLKH. We also demonstrate that reliable key delivery is
critical on WMNs.
WMNs.
• We discuss the applicability of each of the proposed
protocols under different application requirements.

fixed
Wireless mesh networks (WMNs) consist of a set of fixed
wireless routers that form a multi-hop wireless backbone and
a set of wireless clients. In recent years, WMNs have become
a promising key technology for providing low-cost highbandwidth community wireless services. Given the community
oriented nature of the WMNs, group applications such as real
conferencing, multimedia content broadcasting, and file
file
time conferencing,
sharing are an important class of applications in the WMN
environment.
environment. As with other types of wireless applications, the
openness of the wireless environment makes security a critical
concern in deploying such group applications.
The problem of securing group communication in traditional
network environments has received significant attention, such
as the IP multicast [1],
[I], [2], [3]
[3] and overlay multicast networks
[4],
[4], [5],
[S], [6]. However, the constraints and peculiarities of the
wireless medium are not considered by the protocols designed
for wired networks, preventing them from being directly
applied in the wireless environment. For example, the limited
range of the wireless signal mandates multi-hop delivery of
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
follows. We first
both unicast and multicast data, and hence precludes the
11. We then describe the
possibility of direct communication between nodes that some present related work in Section II.
of the protocols for wired networks rely on.
on. The limited com- network and security model we consider in this work in
111. We discuss the design goals and main challenges
munication range also necessitates the participation of non- Section III.
IV. Sections V and VI describe the W-LKH and the
group members in the data forwarding protocol which is absent in Section IV.
Furthermore, unreliable wireless links WSOM protocols. We present the analytical and experimental
in the wired networks. Furthermore,

.

the network. We focus on the group communication scenario
where one data source broadcasts data to a set of receivers
(group
(group members) that can dynamically change throughout
the broadcast session.
session. We assume a tree-based on-demand
multicast protocol is used to deliver the group data. For concreteness, we consider the well-known MAODV [24]
[24] protocol
in presenting our protocols.
Due to the multi-hop communication of WMNs, it is necesnecessary that non-group members participate in the multicast tree
construction. Hence, the multicast tree contains two types of
nodes: member nodes and non-member
nonmember nodes. Member nodes
are nodes on the tree that are also members of the multicast
group. The non-member nodes are not part of the multicast
group.
group but rather act as routers that help to connect the member
nodes. We refer to the nodes in the multicast tree (both member
and non-member) as tree nodes.
nodes. Nodes that are not part of the
multicast tree are called non-tree nodes.

comparison results for the proposed protocols in Section VII
and VIII, respectively.
respectively. We conclude our paper in Section IX.

II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we review the existing work on the secure
group communication problem for both wired networks and
wireless networks.
The problem of secure group communication has received
significant attention for wired networks. In the context of the
IP multicast environment, the main focus was primarily to
reduce the computation overhead of key updates at the source.
[ l ] and its variants
variants
well-known protocols are LKH [1]
The most well-known
[14],
[14], [15],
[IS], [16],
[16], [17],
1171, [18].
[18]. The problem of key transportation
was studied both in the context of IP multicast [15],
[IS], [18]
[18]
and more recently in overlay networks [4],
[4], [19],
[19], [20],
[20], [21],
[21],
[6]. In the latter case, overlays were used as a more realistic
structure to deliver keys due to lack of deployment of IP
multicast. However,
However, none of these protocols considered the
specific constraints and challenges, such as limited
wireless specific
bandwidth, multi-hop communication through possible nonmember nodes and higher link error rates. Thus these protocols
are not directly applicable to WMNs.
In the wireless environment, work related to secure group
communication focused on securing the multicast protocols
and key management. The problem of securing the multicast
[22] is complementary to providing data confidentialprotocol [22]
ity,
ity, as it focuses only on the control message and not the data
traffic.
traffic. Several researchers [7],
[7], [8],
[8], [9]
[9] proposed schemes for
establishing pair-wise symmetric keys for sensor networks and
wireless ad hoc networks. These schemes focus on secure pairwise communications instead of group communications. Zhu
et al
a1 [10]
[lo] proposed GKMPAN,
GKMPAN, a secure group communication
that uses symmetric keys to distribute the common group key
for data encryption among group members. The main focus of
GKMPAN
GKMPAN is on handling member revocations, instead of the
potentially much more frequent member join and leave events.
Moreover, GKMPAN requires key pre-distribution, which is
not always
always available,
available, and a broadcast authentication scheme,
[23], which has the additional requirement of
such as TESLA [23],
time synchronization. Balachandran et al
a1 proposed CRTDH
[ l l ] for secure group communication which relies on the
[11]
Diffie-Hellman group
Chinese Remainder Theorem and the Diffie-Hellman
keys. The shortcoming
key agreement for establishing group keys.
of the CRTDH is that every group join and leave
leave event requires
the number of messages being delivered be proportional to the
size, hence it is not scalable in a wireless environment
group size,
where the bandwidth resource is scarce. Kaya et al
a1 [12]
[12] present
a secure multicast scheme for mobile ad hoc networks. Instead,
our protocols focus
focus on the WMNs which allow
allow for further
topology.
optimizations by exploiting the static network topology.

B. Security and Adversarial Model
focus is on providing confidentiality of the data from
Our focus
outside adversaries,
adversaries, where an outsider is any non-member
node, including non-member nodes that are on the multicast
tree. Nodes that have left the group are also considered
outsiders. We assume that the current group members do not
leak data or keys to non-authorized nodes.
We assume there is a group manager that manages that
group membership. The group manager acts as a certificate
authority (CA)
(CA) for the group, responsible for issuing member
certificates that bind a member's public key to the group IP
address and for revoking group memberships. We also assume
manager,
all group members know the public key of the group manager,
certificates can be verified
verified by any group
so that all member certificates
member.
member.
We do not consider attacks against the multicast protocol
itself. For example, we do not consider denial of service
(DoS) attacks against data forwarding and assume both group
members and non-member nodes forward application and
control data according to the protocol specification. Protecting
the multicast protocol is complementary to our work.
IV. DESIGN
DESIGNSPACE
SPACE
The security goal of our protocol is to ensure data confidentiality. However, this goal should not be achieved at the price
tiality.
specifically,
of sacrificing performance and robustness. More specifically,
properties we want to achieve are:
secrecy: this property makes it computationally
• Group secrecy:
data;
infeasible for a non-member node to discover the group data;
this also includes properties like forward or backward secrecy
which guarantee that it is computationally infeasible for a
member node to get access to group data before joining the
group, or after leaving (or being revoked from) the group,
respectively.
Efficiency: the wireless
wireless environment requires that the pro• Efficiency:
tocol be efficient in terms of both communication cost and
computation cost.

111. NETWORK
A N D SECURITY
SECURITY
MODEL
NETWORK AND
MODEL
III.
A. Network Model

Our target network environment is WMNs, where nodes
are assumed to be static and communicate through multi-hop
wireless links. Possible link and node failures are allowed in
2

• Robustness: the protocol should be resilient to unreliable
links and possible link and node failures.
• Performance: the secure protocol should maintain similar
data throughput to the upper layer application as the unsecured
protocol.
Efficient confidentiality and integrity of data delivery for
group communication can be achieved by using symmetrickey based cryptographic algorithms. We consider two main
approaches: one relies on using a common key to encrypt and
decrypt the data, while the other uses per-hop keys to achieve
the same goals.
Common-key based approach. In this approach,
approach, the critical
Common-key
component is the protocol that defines how the common data
encrypting key (also referred as group key)
key) is computed and
disseminated. Such protocols are also referred to as group key
management protocols. Although the group key management
protocols are already extensively studied for the wired networks, the unique characteristics of wireless communication
introduces new challenges that require new solutions tailored
for the wireless environment. For example, many previously
proposed protocols were designed under the assumption that
there exist mechanisms for reliable key delivery.
delivery. However,
However,
environment, links are inherently much less
in the wireless environment,
reliable. In addition, the multi-hop nature of wireless communication exacerbates the problem of unreliable links, since
missing one key packet at one node affects all downstream
nodes that rely on this node. Therefore;
Therefore,' achieving efficient
reliable key delivery is a critical component for group key
management protocols in wireless networks. Compared to
the wired networks, the key delivery structure is also less
straightforward in the wireless environment. On one hand, the
existing group data delivery structure may not be optimized
for delivering keys, since keys have much more stringent
reliability requirement than data. On the other hand, building
a customized delivery structure for keys requires additional
protocols for handling of possible link and node failures.
Careful selection of the key delivery structure is necessary
for wireless networks.
Per-hop
apPer-hop key based approach.
approach. In the per-hop key based approach, the group data is encrypted hop-by-hop by relying on
the secure channels established between group members. One
of the main challenges for such protocols in the wireless environment is that group members do not directly communicate
with each other. Therefore, non-member nodes are required
in the establishment of the secure channels, which introduces
additional security concerns. Secondly, the straightforward
way of using hop-by-hop encryption disallows the use of
broadcast for data dissemination, instead hop-by-hop unicast
must be used. Additional mechanisms are required for the perhop key approach to take advantage of the broadcast nature
of wireless communication for data dissemination.
Given the above described design space and challenges, in
the rest of the paper, we first present a protocol that adopts the
common key based approach and several
several other protocols that
adopt the per-hop key based approach. We will discuss in detail
how these protocols address the challenges in the wireless

networks, and describe their advantages and limitations.
V. A CENTRALIZED KEY MANAGEMENT PROTOCOL
In this section, we present W-LKH, a secure group communication for WMNs that uses the common key based approach.
We first provide an overview of W-LKH, then describe its
reliable key delivery mechanisms, and finally
finally discuss its limitations.

A. Overview of
of W-LKH
W-LKH
W-LKH is based on a well-known centralized scheme, LKH.
We selected LKH because it was intensively studied and it was
shown to work well in wired networks. We chose its batching
variant [14], which we refer to as B-LKH, given the benefits
of batching in reducing the computation and communication
overhead.
In W-LKH, data is encrypted using a group key and
delivered on the multicast tree. In order to ensure forward
and backward secrecy of the group data, at every join and
leave event, the source is notified and a new key is generated
and distributed to the current group members. As in B-LKH,
the source maintains a logical key tree to ensure a logarithmic
bound for the size of the message rekey. The main difference
between W-LKH and B-LKH is the message delivery process.
Delivery
of join
Delivery of
join and leave messages: In order to maintain
the consistency of the logical key tree maintained at the source,
the join
join and leave requests have to be delivered via reliable
channels. The TCP protocol, which is normally used in wired
networks, does not work well for the delivery of the join
and leave requests on WMNs, as building a TCP session
requires several round trip time and the delivery of several
control packets, and consequently results in large latency
and bandwidth overhead. Instead, we use a simple reliable
transport protocol which involves only an ACK from the
receiver to ensure reliable delivery.
delivery. Therefore, for most cases,
only one round trip time and one additional control message
are required to complete a join or leave request.

B. Rekey Message Transportation
The responsibility of the rekey message transportation process is to deliver the rekey messages generated by the data
source reliably to each group member. The approach we use
for the rekey message transportation is to enhance the existing
MAODV tree built for the data delivery with hop-by-hop
reliability for delivering the rekey messages, such that each
node retransmits the rekey message until all of its downstream
members receives the message.
I) Hop-by-Hop Reliable Key Delivery: The most common
1)
approach to the hop-by-hop reliable delivery is the ACK
mechanism, where the receiver sends an ACK to the sender
after receiving a message, as in the 802.11
802.1 1 unicast protocol.
However, since in the multicast environment, there are usually
However,
multiple downstream receivers for each rekey message, the
ACK mechanism can cause the well-known ACK implosion
problem. Instead, we choose to use the NACK mechanism,
where a node sends a NACK to the sender when it detects
3

packet misses.
misses. The
The missing of rekey messages can be detected
when
when a node
node receives
receives a data packet encrypted with an unknown
key.
key. Since
Since receiving
receiving data packets is a frequent event,
event, the
to the
detection
of
missing
keys
happens
quickly.
Compared
detection
missing keys
quickly.
ACK mechanism,
mechanism, the NACK mechanism also has the benefit
of smaller overhead, as
as it is
is expected that the probability of a
node receiving a rekey
rekey message is greater than the probability
of missing
missing the message.
message.
To
To further reduce the protocol overhead, we exploit the
broadcast nature of wireless
wireless signal
signal by applying the NACK
suppression
[25].With the NACK suppression techsuppression technique [25].
nique,
nique, when a node detects that it misses a rekey message,
instead
instead of firing
firing the NACK immediately,
immediately, it sets a NACK
timer with a random timeout up to some maximum value.
value.
If it receives
receives a NACK from
from another node requesting the same
rekey
rekey message before its
its NACK timer expires, it resets its
NACK timeout value.
value. The
The NACK timer is cancelled once
the
the node
node receives
receives the missing rekey message it requested.
Since
Since most downstream nodes are close to each other,
other, for
most cases
cases only one
one NACK message is necessary even though
multiple
multiple downstream nodes miss
miss the same rekey message.
Furthermore, if the NACK timer is set small enough,
enough, the
missing
missing rekey message can be recovered before the next data
packet is
is broadcasted by the
the parent. This allows
allows for time
sensitive
sensitive applications to resume the decryption of data as soon
as
as possible while
while keeping the
the overhead low.
low.
2)
2) Rekey Message Recovery:
Recovery: Even with hop-by-hop reliability,
bility, a number of rekey messages can still be lost for a large
duration
duration of time for
for a particular node due to link or node
failures
failures and network partitions. In such cases, the key recovery
procedure is
is invoked
invoked to recover the missing keys. Instead of
the missing
missing packets directly from the data source, as
requesting the
in the
the wired network, we adopt a local
local recovery procedure in
in
to minimize the bandwidth overhead while not affecting
order to
the application performance.
the
The local
local recovery procedure is
is only invoked at a node
The
the node
node can receive
receive a continuous stream of data packets
when the
from its
its upstream node,
node, as
as the continuous stream of data
from
packets indicates the path between the node and the data
packets
source is
is functional.
functional. To
To initiate
initiate the local recovery process, the
source
node transmits
transmits a NACK packet containing all the sequence
node
numbers of the missing rekey messages to its tree parent.
numbers
Once the
the tree parent receives
receives the NACK packet, it sends to
Once
the requesting node the requested rekey messages
messages for which
the
messages, a local
has already received.
received. For the other rekey messages,
itit has
is recursively invoked on the tree parent.
recovery procedure is
The process repeats
repeats until all
all the requested rekey messages are
The
delivered to
to the original requesting node.
delivered
in the above
above described
described local recovery process,
Note that in
is necessary for
for each node to buffer the rekey messages
itit is
for some
some period of time so that the request
that it receives for
for missing rekey
rekey messages
messages from downstream nodes can be
for
satisfied as
as locally
locally as
as possible. Since rekey messages are of
satisfied
small
size
and
are
issued
infrequently with the batch rekeying
small size
are
is feasible
feasible for
for each nodes to buffer recent rekey
technique, it is
for the purpose of rekey message recovery.
recovery.
messages for
4

3)
3 ) Data and Key Message Ordering: Since in the above
rekey transportation and recovery scheme the missing of
of
rekey messages is detected by receiving data packets that
are encrypted with unknown keys, we require that each node
forwards only data packets for which it has the decryption key
and buffers undecryptable data packets until the corresponding
corresponding
decryption key has been received and forwarded to the downstream node. This requirement minimizes the out-of-order
out-of-order
problem of key and data message, thus reducing the number
number
of NACKs for missing key messages. Under most cases, it
also ensures that when a node receives a NACK for a rekey
message, it has already received the requested rekey message,
of NACK message is eliminated.
thus recursive propagation of
undecryptable packets does not
Note that delaying forwarding undecryptable
affect the data throughput for the application, as a packet
undecryptable in its
undecryptable in a node is necessarily undecryptable
downstream nodes.
C.
of W-LKH
C. Limitations of
W-LKH

Although W-LKH has been optimized for the WMNs, it
still has several limitations. First, the join
join and leave requests
joining or leaving
require message exchanges between the joining
node to the data source. Depending on the distance from the
joining or leaving node to the data source, this operation can
joining
incur significant latency and bandwidth overhead. Second, the
rekey message which includes key encryptions required
required by
all the group members needs to be transmitted throughout
throughout
the multicast tree, even though typically only a subset of
of
particular branch of
of the
the encryptions are required by a particular
tree. Finally, the use of
of batching for reducing the bandwidth
bandwidth
of the forward and backward
overhead also causes partial loss of
secrecy. These limitations are the consequence
data secrecy.
consequence of
of the fundamental design choice made by the LKH scheme, centralized
centralized
group membership management, where the data source is the
central point that handles all group join
join and leave events.
VI. SECURE
SECUREOVERLAY
OVERLAY BASED
BASED SECURE
SECURE MULTICAST
MULTICAST IN
WMNs
In this section, we present a new secure multicast
multicast protocol
framework, WSOM, that uses the decentralized
decentralized membership
management principle to address the limitations in W-LKH.
We first provide an overview of
of the framework, then present
present
three different protocols and a member revocation mechanism.

A. Overview of
of WSOM
The WSOM framework is based on an overlay tree maintained on top of
of the data delivery multicast
multicast tree. The overlay
consists of only member nodes and two member
member nodes are
connected on the overlay if
if they are adjacent in the underlying
underlying
multicast tree disregarding non-member
non-member nodes. Figure 1I shows
an example of the overlay structure for a sample multicast
multicast scenario. Neighboring nodes on the overlay maintain a symmetric
key, referred to as link key, between them, which establishes
a secure channel between these two nodes. We refer to this
overlay network as a secure overlay. Since we only consider
consider
tree based multicast structure, the overlay structure we just
just

1)
I ) WSOM-GK:
WSOM-GK: WSOM
WSOM with
with Group
Group Key
Key for Data
Data EncrypEncrypdescribed is necessarily a tree. For convenience, we use the
In this
this protocol,
protocol, aa group
group key
key isis maintained
maintained among
among all
all
tion: In
term overlay parent, overlay children and overlay neighbor to tion:
group members.
members. The
The group
group data
data isis encrypted
encrypted with
with the
the group
group
refer to the parent, children, and neighbor of a node in the group
key
key at
at the
the source,
source, then
then disseminated
disseminated on
on the
the multicast
multicast tree.
tree.
overlay, respectively.
The source
source periodically
periodically refreshes
refreshes the
the group
group key
key by
by generating
generating
The
new group
group key.
key. The
The new
new group
group key
key isis disseminated
disseminated to
to all
all
aa new
group members
members using
using the
the secure
secure overlay.
overlay.
group
SOOUfJ;)
For group
group joins,
joins, besides
besides updating
updating the
the secure
secure overlay,
overlay, the
the
For
Overtay
overlay parent
parent of
of the
the joining
joining node
node piggy-backs
piggy-backs the
the current
current
overlay
group
group key
key on
on the
the messages
messages required
required for
for updating
updating the
the secure
secure
overlay,
overlay, so
so that
that the
the joining
joining node
node can
can start
start decrypting
decrypting group
group
Mulficast
data
immediately.
For
group
leaves,
only
the
update
of
the
of
the
data
immediately.
For
group
leaves,
only
the
update
Tref!
secure overlay
overlayisisrequired.
required. Key
Key loss
loss due
dueto
to node
nodeor
or link
linkfailures
failures
secure
can
can be
be handled
handled in
in aa way
way similar
similar to
to the
the local
local key
key recovery
recovery
strategy
strategy in
in W-LKH.
W-LKH.
The
The main
main limitation
limitation of
of this
this protocol
protocol isis that
that itit suffers
suffers
from
from partial
partial loss
loss of
of the
the forward
forward and
and backward
backward data
data secrecy.
secrecy.
However,
However,the
the application
applicationcan
can adjust
adjustthe
the key
key refreshment
refreshment period
period
Fig.
Fig. 1.1. Example
Example secure
secure overlay
overlay
to
to balance
balance the
the bandwidth
bandwidth overhead
overhead and
and the
the loss
loss of
of the
the forward
forward
Maintenance
Maintenance of
of the
the Secure
Secure Overlay:
Overlay: The
The key
key for
for maintainmaintain- and
and backward
backward secrecy.
secrecy.
ing
ing the
the secure
secure overlay
overlay isis for
foreach
each node
node to
to maintain
maintain an
an updated
updated
2) WSOM-LK:
WSOM-LK: WSOM
WSOM with
with Link
Link Key
Keyfor
for Data
Data Encryption:
Encryption:
2)
link
link key
key with
with its
its overlay
overlay neighbors
neighbors as
as the
the underlying
underlying multicast
multicast In
In this
this protocol,
protocol, the
the group
group data
data isis delivered
delivered directly
directly on
on the
the
tree
tree changes,
changes, which
which can
can be
be caused
caused by
by group
groupjoin,
join, group
group leave,
leave, secure
secure overlay.
overlay. To
To forward
forward aa data
data packet,
packet, the
the node
node encrypts
encrypts
and
and link
link and
and node
node failures.
failures. We
We now
now present
present the
the operations
operations the
thedata
data packet
packetwith
withthe
the link
linkkey
keyof
ofeach
eachof
of its
itsoverlay
overlaychildren
children
required
required for
for handling
handling each
each such
such event
event inin detail.
detail.
and
and then
then forwards
forwards the
the encrypted
encrypted packet
packet toto the
the corresponding
corresponding
For
For group
group joins,
joins, after
after being
being part
part of
of the
the multicast
multicast tree,
tree, the
the children.
children.This
Thisbasic
basic scheme
schemesuffers
suffersfrom
from two
two drawbacks.
drawbacks.First,
First,
joining
joining node
node communicates
communicates with
with its
its overlay
overlay parent
parent along
along the
the re-encrypting
re-encrypting the
the data
data packet
packet for
for each
each of
of the
the overlay
overlay children
children
multicast
multicast tree
tree path
path toto establish
establish aa link
link key
key using
using the
the standard
standard requires
requires computation
computation cost
cost linear
linear toto the
the number
number of
of overlay
overlay
public
(PKI)techniques.
techniques.If
If the
thejoining
joining node
node children
public key
key infrastructure
infrastructure (PKl)
children for
foreach
eachnode,
node, which
whichcan
canbe
besignificant
significantfor
fornodes
nodeswith
with
isis already
already aa tree
tree node
node before
before joining,
joining, itit also
also needs
needs toto build
build aa many
manychildren.
children.Second,
Second,ititisisimpossible
impossibletotoexploit
exploitthe
thebroadcast
broadcast
link
link key
key with
with each
eachof
of its
itsoverlay
overlay children.
children.To
Toaccomplish
accomplish this,
this, nature
nature of
of wireless
wirelesstransmission,
transmission, as
aseach
each of
of the
the encrypted
encrypted data
data
the
the joining
joining node
node broadcasts
broadcasts aa parent
parent change
change packet
packet including
including packet
packet isis only
only useful
useful for
for one
one downstream
downstream child.
child.To
To overcome
overcome
its
its member
member certificate
certificate downward
downward along
along the
the tree.
tree. Each
Each of
of its
its these
thesedrawbacks,
drawbacks, instead
insteadof
of using
using link
linkkeys
keystotoencrypt
encrypt the
thedata
data
overlay
overlay children,
children, upon
upon receiving
receiving the
the parent
parent change
change packet,
packet, packets
packets directly,
directly, the
the source
source encrypts
encrypts the
the data
data packet
packet with
with aa
generates
generates aa random
random link
link key
key and
and sends
sends itit toto the
thejoining
joining node
node randomly
( k d ) To
.To disseminate
disseminate
randomly generated
generated data
data encryption
encryption key
key (kd)'
after
PKI the
after proper
proper signing
signing and
and encrypting
encrypting using
using the
the standard
standard PKI
the data
data packet,
packet, the
the source
source encrypts
encrypts kd
kd with
with the
the link
link key
key of
of
techniques.
techniques. For
For graceful
graceful group
group leaves,
leaves, the
the overlay
overlay parent
parent of
of each
each of
of its
its overlay
overlay children,
children, piggy-backs
piggy-backs all
all the
the encryptions
encryptions
the
the leaving
leaving node
node isis notified
notified of
of the
the event
event and
and establishes
establishes link
link of
kd toto the
the data
data packet,
packet, and
and then
then broadcasts
broadcasts the
the packet
packet on
on
of kd
keys
keys with
with the
the overlay
overlay children
children of
of the
the leaving
leaving node
node inin aa way
way the
themulticast
multicasttree.
tree.When
Whenaamember
membernode
nodereceives
receivesan
anencrypted
encrypted
that
that isissimilar
similar toto when
when the
thejoining
joining node
node builds
builds link
link keys
keys with
with packet,
kdwith
with its
its
packet,ititcan
candecrypt
decryptthe
thepacket
packetby
by first
firstdecrypting
decryptingkd
its
its overlay
overlay children.
children. For
For ungraceful
ungraceful leaves
leaves and
and link
link and
and node
node corresponding
corresponding link
linkkey
key and
andthen
then using
using kd
kdtoto decrypt
decrypt the
the data
data
failures,
failures,the
the link
linkkeys
keys are
arere-established
re-established once
oncethe
thedownstream
downstream packet.
packet.For
Forforwarding
forwarding the
the received
received packet
packet toto its
its downstream
downstream
nodes
nodes get
get reconnected
reconnected back
back toto the
the tree
tree much
much like
like the
thejoining
joining nodes,
nodes, the
the member
member node
node re-encrypts
re-encrypts kd
kd with
with the
the link
link keys
keys
case.
case.
kd encryptions
encryptions on
on
of
of its
its overlay
overlay children,
children, and
and replaces
replaces the
the kd
Note
Note that
that inin handling
handling all
all of
of the
the above
above events,
events, only
only local
local the
kd.
the received
received packet
packet with
with the
the new
new set
set of
of encryptions
encryptions of
of kd.
message
message exchanges
exchanges are
are required.
required. Moreover,
Moreover, inin the
the WMN
WMN Although
Although the
thenumber
numberof
ofencryptions
encryptions required
requiredfor
foreach
eachnode
nodeisis
environment,
environment, where
where all
all nodes
nodes are
are static,
static, most
most changes
changes on
on also
also linear
linear totothe
thenumber
numberof
ofoverlay
overlaychildren
childrenof
of the
thenode,
node,this
this
the
the underlying
underlying multicast
multicast tree
tree are
aredue
duetoto group
groupjoin
join and
and leave
leave scheme
kdisis
schemeisisstill
stillcomputation-wise
computation-wiseefficient,
efficient,asasthe
thesize
sizeof
ofkd
events.
events.Therefore,
Therefore,for
forstable
stablegroups
groupsand
andnetwork
networkenvironment,
environment, typically
128bits.
bits.
typically only
only 128
the
theoverhead
overheadfor
formaintaining
maintaining the
thesecure
secureoverlay
overlayisisvery
verysmall.
small.
Since
Sinceno
no additional
additional control
control data
data isis maintained
maintained inin WSOMWSOMLK, the
the handling
handling of
of join
join and
and leave
leave events
events only
only requires
requires
LK,
B.B. WSOM
WSOMProtocols
Protocols
updating
updatingthe
thesecure
secureoverlay.
overlay.Unlike
UnlikeWSOM-GK,
WSOM-GK,this
thisprotocol
protocol
doesnot
not suffer
sufferfrom
fromkey
key loss
lossproblem.
problem.
In
I n this
this section,
section, we
we present
present three
threedifferent
different secure
securemulticast
multicast does
3)3) WSOM-HK:
WSOM-HK:WSOM
WSOMwith
withHop
Hop Key
Keyfor
for Data
Data Encryption:
Encryption:
protocols
protocols that
that use
usethe
thesecure
secureoverlay
overlaystructure
structureasasdescribed
described inin
WSOM-LK, even
even with
with the
the optimization
optimization of
of using
using data
data
the
the previous
previous section:
section: WSOM-GK,
WSOM-GK, WSOM-LK,
WSOM-LK, and
and WSOMWSOM- InIn WSOM-LK,
encryption
keys,
there
is
still
per
data
packet
computation
and
encryption
keys,
there
is
still
per
data
packet
computation
and
HK.
HK.
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bandwidth overhead on each member node for
only needs to delivery
delivery the revocation notice to the
for encrypting and manager only
node1. Once all
all the join points
delivering
delivering the key for each of its overlay children. The
The aim of pre-selected join points of the node'.
WSOM-HK is
is to reduce both the
the computation and bandwidth of the node receive the revocation notice, the node can no
overhead by maintaining a hop key among
secure overlay,
overlay, thus loses
loses its ability to decrypt
among every
every member node longer join the secure
and
group data.
data.
and its
its overlay children. With
With the
the help of the
the hop key,
key, the
the data
data the group
2 ) Details of
of WSOM-revoke:
WSOM-revoke: Now we
we discuss some
some more
2)
encryption key
key only needs
needs to
to be encrypted once
once with
with the hop
hop
subtle details of the
the WSOM-revoke
WSOM-revoke protocol.
key and
and only one
one encryption of the
the key needs
needs to
to be appended subtle
the join points To
To obtain a suitable set
set of
to
to the
the data
data packet for
for forwarding to
to the
the downstream
downstream nodes, Pre-selecting the
points, the
the joining node broadcasts in
in the local
local scope
scope
instead
instead of one
one for
for each
each overlay child as
as in
in the WSOM-LK join points,
request message.
message. The
The member nodes
nodes that receive
a member request
protocol.
protocol.
Each hop key can
can be regarded as
as a mini
mini group
group key with
with the member request message reply a member reply message
including its
its identity and its
its distance
distance to
to the
the data source.
source. The
The
the
the member node
node as
as the
the source
source and
and its
its overlay children as
as including
node then selects
selects the
the best join points
points among
among all
all the
the
the group
group members.
members. Due
Due to
to the
the small
small scale,
scale, a straightforward joining node
who replied by considering
considering the
the distance of the
the
approach,
approach, such
such as
as encrypting
encrypting and
and delivering
delivering the new
new hop
hop key member nodes who
to itself and to
to the
the data
data source.
source.
to
to each of the
the overlay
overlay children whenever
whenever the
the overlay
overlay children replying member node to
The size
size of the
the join point set
set In order to
to prevent arbitrary
The
set
set changes,
changes, can
can be employed to
to maintain the
the hop
hop key.
key.
large join point set,
set, which
which can
can potentially be used to
to mount
The
The cost of maintaining a hop
hop key is
is amortized
amortized over
over all
all large
DoS attack during
during the revocation process and to
to delay the
the
the data packets
packets delivered using
using that key.
key. Unlike WSOM-LK DoS
revocation of the
the node,
node, the group
group manager can impose an
an
scheme,
scheme, this
this scheme
scheme has
has lower
lower per packet overhead.
overhead.
on the
the number of join points each
each node
node can
can use.
use.
upper bound on
C.
C. Revocation in
in the
the WSOM
WSOM Based Protocols
Protocols
to the
the static
static nature
nature of the network topology,
topology, an
an upper
Due to
as few
few as
as three can
can be sufficient.
sufficient.
Unlike in
in the
the centralized membership management schemes bound as
Unlike
leaves Since
Since group
group leave
leave is
is a common event,
event,
where member revocations
revocations can
can be easily
easily performed by the
the cencen- Handling group leaves
is possible for
for a node that its
its actual
actual join point decides
decides to
to
tral point,
point, in
in decentralized membership management schemes,
schemes, it is
tral
leave the
the group,
group, or all
all the
the pre-selected join points of the
the node
separate membership
membership revocation mechanism
mechanism has
has to
to be pro- leave
a separate
leave the
the group.
group. In
In both cases,
cases, itit is
is desirable
desirable that
that the
the ability
ability
vided.
vided. Instead
Instead of
of using
using the
the straightforward
straightforward certificate
certificate rere- leave
of the
the node
node to
to join the
the secure
secure overlay
overlay isis not
not affected.
affected. To
To
vocation
vocation list
list (CRL)
(CRL) approach,
approach, which
which requires
requires the
the reliable of
achieve this,
this, we
we introduce
introduce aa join point
point delegation
delegation mechanism.
mechanism.
delivery
delivery of
of the
the CRLs
CRLs to
to all
all group
group members,
members, we
we design
design aa achieve
With the
the delegation
delegation mechanism,
mechanism, when
when aa node
node decides
decides to
to leave
leave
new more
more efficient
efficient revocation
revocation mechanisms
mechanisms for
for the
the WSOM
WSOM With
new
the group,
group, itit delegates
delegates the
the join point responsibility
responsibility for
for its
its
The main
main observation
observation we
we exploit
exploit isis that
that the
based protocols. The
overlay children
children to
to its
its overlay
overlay parent
parent by
by sending
sending aa signed
signed
the static
static topology of
of WMNs,
WMNs, itit is
is possible
possible to
to restrict overlay
under the
delegation message
message to
to its
its overlay
overlay parent.
parent. Similarly,
Similarly, when
when aa
node to
to join the
the secure
secure overlay
overlay only
only through
through aa few
few nearby delegation
aa node
node that
that has
has left
left the
the group
group receives
receives join request,
request, itit delegates
delegates
member nodes,
nodes, which
which we
we will
will refer
refer to
to as
as the
the join points of
of node
the join point responsibility
responsibility to
to its
its overlay
overlay parent
parent with
with aa signed
signed
the node.
node. Then to
to revoke
revoke aa member node,
node, itit is
is sufficient
sufficient to
to the
the
delegation message.
message. Therefore,
Therefore, in
in both
both cases,
cases, the
the joining node
node
delivery
delivery the
the revocation
revocation notice
notice to
to only
only the
the small
small number
number of
of delegation
can continue
continue to
to join the
the secure
secure overlay
overlay via
via the
the join point
point that
that
points of
of the
the node,
node, instead
instead of
of to
to the
the whole
whole group,
group, thus
thus can
join points
has left;
left; its
its ability
ability to
to join the
the secure
secure overlay
overlay isis oblivious
oblivious of
of
saving
saving the
the network
network bandwidth.
bandwidth. In
In the
the following,
following, we
we describe
describe has
the leave
leave status
status of
of its
its selected
selected join points.
points.
the
the details
details of
of the
the revocation
revocation protocol together with
with the
the required
required the
Updating join points
points It
It isis possible that
that all
all of
of the
the pre-selected
pre-selected
changes
changes on
on the
the WSOM
WSOM protocol. For
For convenience,
convenience, we
we refer
refer Updating
points of
of aa member
member node
node are
are revoked
revoked or
or fail.
fail. In
In such
such
to our
our revocation
revocation protocol as
as WSOM-revoke
WSOM-revoke and
and the
the entity
entity join points
to
cases, itit isis necessary
necessary for
for the
the member
member node
node to
to obtain
obtain new
new join
responsible
responsible for
for issuing
issuing and
and revoking
revoking the
the member certificates
certificates cases,
in order
order to
to continue
continue to
to participate in
in the
the secure
secure overlay.
overlay.
as
as the
the group
group manager.
manager.
points in
member node
node may
may also
also desire
desire to
to change
change its
its join point set
set if
if
1)
1) Overview
Overview of
of WSOM-revoke:
WSOM-revoke: With
With WSOM-revoke,
WSOM-revoke, prior A member
finds aa better set
set of
of join points.
points. In
In both cases,
cases, aa join point
to obtaining
obtaining the
the member certificate,
certificate, the
the node
node attempting
attempting to
to itit finds
to
called for.
for. With
With WSOM-revoke,
WSOM-revoke, updating
join the
the group
group selects
selects aa set
set of
of its
its nearby member nodes
nodes as
as update procedure isis called
points is
is achieved
achieved by
by obtaining
obtaining aa new
new member
member certificate
certificate
its join points. Then
Then during
during the
the process obtaining
obtaining the
the member join points
its
with the
the new
new join
join point
point set
set from
from the
the group
group manager.
manager. Since
Since
certificate,
certificate, the
the node
node provides
provides the
the pre-selected
pre-selected join points
points to
to with
expected that
that the
the member
member revocation
revocation and
and failure
failure events
events
the
the group
group manager,
manager, which
which then
then saves
saves the
the join
join points
points and
and also
also itit isis expected
are infrequent
infrequent and
and the
the static
static network
network environment
environment limits
limits the
the
includes them
them in
in the
the member
member certificate
certificate for
for the
the node.
node. To
To join
join are
includes
opportunity of
of finding
finding better
better join
join points,
points, we
we expect
expect the
the join
join
the secure
secure overlay,
overlay, the
the node
node only
only activates
activates the
the multicast
multicast tree
tree opportunity
the
branch that
that leads
leads to
to one
one of
of its
its pre-selected
pre-selected join points,
points, which
which
branch
~ e l i v e r i nthe
the
~ revocation
revocation notice
notice to
to the
the join
join points
points of
of the
the node
node isis sufficient
sufficient
I' Delivering
we will
will refer
refer to
to its
its actual
actual join point.
point. The
The actual
actual join
join point
point for
we
for denying
denying the
the access
access to
to the
the group
group data
data for
for the
the node.
node. The
The revocation
revocation notice
notice
verifies that
that itself
itself isis in
in the
the set
set of
of pre-selected
pre-selected join points
points of
of may
verifies
may also
also need
need to
to be
be delivered
delivered to
to the
the member
member nodes
nodes which
which have
have the
the revoked
revoked
node as
as one
one of
of its
its join
join points,
points, so
so that
that those
those nodes
nodes will
will not
not select
select the
the revoked
revoked
the joining
joining node
node by
by checking
checking the
the node's
node's member
member certificate
certificate and
and node
the
node as
as their
their overlay
overlay parent.
parent. However,
However, under
under the
the assumption
assumption of
of no
no DoS
DoS attack,
attack,
node
that the
the joining node
node isis not
not revoked
revoked before
before admitting
admitting the
the node
node the
that
the revoked
revoked node
node cannot
cannot pretend
pretend to
to be
be member
member node
node to
to prevent
prevent member
member nodes'
nodes'
as its
its overlay
overlay child.
child. Now,
Now, to
to revoke
revoke aa member
member node,
node, the
the group
group access
as
access to
to data.
data.
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point
pointupdate
updateprocedure
procedureisisonly
onlyinvoked
invokedinfrequently,
infrequently,hence
hencethe
the The
TheMAODV
MAODV implementation
implementation we
we used
used isis provided
provided by
by Zhu
Zhu etet
ala1[26].
centralized
centralized design
designfor
forhandling
handlingthe
theprocedure
procedureisis acceptable.
acceptable.
[26].
Nodes
Nodes are
are configured
configured toto use
use the
the IEEE
IEEE 802.11
802.1 1 radios
radios with
with
COMPARISON
VII.
VII. ANALYTICAL
ANALYTICAL
COMPARISON
2Mbps
physical
bandwidth
and
250-meter
nominal
2Mbps physical bandwidth and 250-meter nominal range.
range. In
In
eachsimulation,
simulation, 100
100nodes
nodesare
arerandomly
randomly placed
placed within
within aa 1500
1500
InIn this
this section,
section, we
we analyze
analyze and
and compare
compare the
the overhead
overhead of
of each
meters by
by 1500
1500meters
meters area
area and
and the
the multicast
multicast data
data source
source isis
the
theproposed
proposedprotocols.
protocols. We
Wefocus
focuson
onthe
the communication
communication cost
cost meters
placed
at
the
center
of
the
area
at
the
coordinates
(750,
750).
placed
at
the
center
of
the
area
at
the
coordinates
(750,
750).
since
sincebandwidth
bandwidth isis the
the main
main limitation.
limitation.
The
duration
of
a
simulation
is
900
seconds.
In
the
beginThe
duration
of
a
simulation
is
900
seconds.
In
the
beginInInorder
ordertotohave
haveaaclear
clearcomparison
comparisonbetween
between the
the protocols,
protocols,
ning of
of each
each simulation,
simulation, aa set
set of
of nodes
nodes are
are randomly
randomly selected
selected
we
we make
makethe
the following
followingassumptions.
assumptions. We
We assume
assume there
there isis no
no ning
bethe
the initial
initialgroup
groupmembers
members and
andjoin
join the
the group
group sequentially
sequentially
interference,
interference, thus
thus the
the bandwidth
bandwidth cost
cost for
for sending
sending aa message
message totobe
the rate
rate of
of one
one join
join per
per three
three seconds.
seconds. For
For experiments
experiments
depends
depends only
only on
on the
the path
path length
length (in
(in hop
hop count)
count) and
and the
the size
size atat the
with no
no group
group dynamics,
dynamics, the
the initial
initial group
group size
size isis the
the fixed
fixed
of
denote the
the bandwidth
bandwidth cost
cost of
of with
of the
the message.
message. We
We use
use bbtoto denote
group
size
for
the
experiment.
For
experiments
with
group
transmittingone
onebyte
bytetotothe
thegroup
groupvia
viathe
themulticast.
multicast.Thus,
Thus,the
the group size for the experiment. For experiments with group
transmitting
dynamics, the
theinitial
initialgroup
groupsize
sizeisis the
the stable
stablegroup
group size
size for
for the
the
thegroup
group dynamics,
bandwidthcost
costof
ofmulticasting
multicasting aapacket
packetof
ofsize
sizeDD totothe
bandwidth
experiment.
After
the
initial
joins
are
completed,
the
source
experiment.
After
the
initial
joins
are
completed,
the
source
bD.We
Weassume
assumethat
thatthe
thelatency
latency of
of aamessage
messagedepends
dependsonly
only
isisbD.
starts toto multicast
multicast data
data packets
packets of
of size
size 256
256 bytes
bytes to
to the
the group
group
on
onthe
thenumber
numberof
ofhops
hopstravelled
travelled by
by the
the message
messageand
andboth
bothjoin
join starts
to
each
experiment
until
the
end
of
the
at
a
rate
specific
at
a
rate
specific
to
each
experiment
until
the
end
of
the
and
and leave
leave require
require only
only one
one round
round trip
trip of
of message
message exchange.
exchange.
simulation.
simulation. For
For the
the experiments
experiments that
that examine
examine the
the effect
effect of
of
Table
TableIIshows
showsall
all the
the parameters
parameters we
we use
use inin the
the comparison.
comparison.
group dynamics,
dynamics, the
the data
data rate
rate isis fixed
fixed atat 55 packets/second.
packetslsecond.
showsthe
the results
results of
ofdifferent
different metrics
metrics for
fordifferent
different group
TableIII1shows
Table
Based
Basedon
onpreviously
previouslyobserved
observed group
groupdynamics
dynamicsfor
for multicast
multicast
operations
operationsininthe
theproposed
proposed protocols.
protocols. Based
Based on
onthese
thesecomparcomparapplications [27],
[27], [28],
[28], [29],
[29],we
we use
use Poisson
Poisson process
process to
to model
model
ison results,
results, we
wenow
now highlight
highlight aa few
few differences
differences between
between the
the applications
ison
the
member
join
and
leave
events
with
different
rates
to
the
member
join
and
leave
events
with
different
rates
to reflect
reflect
protocols.
protocols.
different levels
levels of
of group
group dynamics.
dynamics. We
We set
set the
the join
join and
and leave
leave
For join
join and
and leave
leave operations,
operations, there
there isis potentially
potentially aa large
large different
• For
rates
to
be
equal,
so
the
group
size
remains
stable.
For
each
rates
to
be
equal,
so
the
group
size
remains
stable.
For
each
bandwidth and
and latency
latency cost
cost for
for W-LKH
W-LKH (depending
(depending on
on the
the
bandwidth
is
selected
to
join
the
join
event,
a
random
non-member
node
join
event,
a
random
non-member
node
is
selected
to
join
the
distance between
between the
the data
data source
source and
and the
the joining
joining or
or leaving
leaving
distance
group;
similarly
for
each
leave
event,
a
random
member
node
group;
similarly
for
each
leave
event,
a
random
member
node
node), whereas,
whereas, WSOM
WSOM based
based schemes
schemes only
only incur
incur constant
constant
node),
isis selected
selected toto leave
leave the
the group.
group.
costs.
costs.
rekeying (which
(which includes
includes
For
protocols
that
require
periodic rekeying
For
protocols
that
require
periodic
W-LKH
and
WSOM-GK,
which
use
the
common
group
key
• W-LKH and WSOM-GK, which use the common group key
rekey period
period isis set
set to
to
B-LKH, W-LKH
W-LKH and
and WSOM-GK),
WSOM-GK), the
the rekey
rekey operations,
operations, whereas,
whereas, no
no B-LKH,
encrypt group
group data,
data, require
require rekey
toto encrypt
be 30
30 seconds.
seconds.The
The maximum
maximum NACK
NACK timeout
timeout value
value used
used for
for
rekey operations
operations are
are necessary
necessary for
for WSOM-LK
WSOM-LK and
and WSOMWSOM- be
rekey
the reliable
reliable key
key delivery
delivery isis set
set toto be
be lOOms.
100ms. We
We also
also assume
assume
rekey operations
operations consume
consume network
network bandwidth
bandwidth rere- the
HK. The
The rekey
HK.
in
all
the
protocols
the
size
of
symmetric
keys
is
128
bits,
the
in
all
the
protocols
the
size
of
symmetric
keys
is
128
bits,
the
source, while
while batching
batching introduces
introducesaa vulnerability
vulnerability window.
window.
source,
size
of
publiclprivate
keys
is
1024
bits,
and
the
computation
of
public/private
keys
is
1024
bits,
and
the
computation
size
WSOM based
based protocols
protocols require
require explicit
explicit revocation
revocation mesmes• WSOM
PKI signatures
signatures isis 4ms.
4 m 2~ . ~
delay for
for PKI
sages,which
whichisisnot
notnecessary
necessaryfor
forW-LKH.
W-LKH.In
Inapplications
applications with
with delay
sages,
Weexperimented
experimented with
withdifferent
differentgroup
group sizes,
sizes, however,
however, since
since
We
only infrequent
infrequentrevocations,
revocations,the
the bandwidth
bandwidth cost
costfor
forrevocation
revocation
only
the
comparison
results
of
different
protocols
are
similar
for
the
comparison
results
of
different
protocols
are
similar
for
insignificant. For
For applications
applicationsthat
that require
requirefrequent
frequent revocarevocaisis insignificant.
different
group
sizes,
we
only
present
the
results
for
the
group
different
group
sizes,
we
only
present
the
results
for
the
group
tions,
we
can
batch
process
the
revocations
in
the
same
way
tions, we can batch process the revocations in the same way
size of
of 50.
50. In
In all
all the
the figures,
figures, each
each data
data point
point isis the
the average
average
batchingthe
therekey
rekeyoperations
operations for
forthe
the group
groupkey
key and
and use
use the
the size
asasbatching
of 10
10 different
different runs
runs with
with different
different random
random topologies
topologies and
and
life time
time of
of membership
membership certificates
certificates toto reduce
reduce the
the revocation
revocation of
life
different
random
group
join
and
leave
events.
different
random
group
join
and
leave
events.
bandwidth overhead
overhead toto an
anacceptable
acceptable range.
range.
bandwidth
For common
common group
group key
key based
based protocols
protocols (W-LKH
(W-LKH and
and
• For
B. Metrics
WSOM-GK), there
there isis no
no per
per data
data packet
packet overhead,
overhead, whereas,
whereas, B. Metrics
WSOM-GK),
We measure
measure the
the performance
performance of
of the
the secure
secure multicast
multicast proproWe
WSOM-LK and
and WSOM-HK
WSOM-HK incur
incur per
per data
data packet
packet overhead.
overhead.
WSOM-LK
delivery ratio
ratio and
and the
the decryption
decryption
tocols with
with two
two metrics,
metrics, the
the delivery
tocols
VIII. EXPERIMENTAL
EXPERIMENTAL
EVALUATIONS
VIII.
EVALUATIONS
ratio. For
For each
each member
member node,
node, the
the delivery
delivery ratio
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ratio.
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fraction
of
data
packets
that
are
received
by
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node
as
the
fraction
of
data
packets
that
are
received
by
the
node
In this
this section,
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we present
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the results
results of
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member node
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then The
delivery for
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groupkey
key management
management protocols
protocols inin WMNs,
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fraction
of
data
packets
that
can
be
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by
the
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of
data
packets
that
can
be
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by
the
member
fraction
weevaluate
evaluateand
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performance and
andoverhead
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of the
the
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of all
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the data
data packets
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member. Thus,
Thus,
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secure multicast
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protocol on
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protocol
Simulation Setup
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A.A. Simulation

We implemented
implemented our
our experiments
experimentsbased
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on the
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ns network
network
We
'This value
value isis based
based on
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the 1024
1024 bits
bits RSA
RSA implementation
implementation of
of openssl
openssl
2This
on 3GHz
3GHz Intel
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Pentium IV
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simulator [13]
[13](version
(version 2.26)
2.26) with
with CMU
CMU Monarch
Monarch extensions.
extensions. on
simulator
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I number of members

~

multicast tree height
average tree degree
data packet size
symmetric key length
CRL length
Total message size exchanged for
join or leave
distance between the joining or
leaving node and the source
bandwidth cost for group multicast

n 1
I n
h

d
D
k

r
s

1
I

86
b

WSOM-GK
s
2

WSOM-LK
s
2

WSOM-HK
s+dk
3"

bklogn

bdk

h

h

-

-

-

br
h

br +bk
h
bk
h
No

h

h

bdr
h
bdk
h

Yes

Yes

No

a

a

I1
TABLE II

TABLE I
PARAMETERS
FOR PROTOCOL OVERHEAD
PARAMETERS

8s
28

W-LKH
bandwidth
JoinlLeave
latency
bandwidth
Rekey
latency
bandwidth
Revoke
latency
bandwidth
Data
latency
vulnerability window?

OVERHEAD
COMPARISON
OVERHEAD
COMPARISON RESULTS

"One
uOne additionalI hop time for the new link key

COMPARISONS

similar high delivery ratio as in the case where no security
mechanisms are being used. The decryption ratios for all the
protocols are also almost 1. Therefore, we conclude that all
the proposed protocols can provide good transparency in terms
of data throughput to the upper layer applications. We also
experimented with random node and link failures to examine
failures. The
the robustness of the protocols in the case of failures.
resulting performance is similar to the performance results
shown for the case with no artificial failures. We omit these
graphs for the lack of space.

protocol, whereas, the decryption ratio measures the impact
of the secure multicast protocol on the actual data goodput
received by the upper layer application. In order to get a
lower bound on the delivery ratio and the decryption ratio,
we assume the upper layer application requires time sensitive
delivery,
delivery, that is, a member node cannot buffer undecryptable
packets for decryption and forwarding
forwarding upon the receiving of
proper keys, instead such packets are dropped by the member.
member.
The overhead of the secure multicast protocols are measured
in terms of the bandwidth overhead of the protocol and the
latency for group join and leave events.
events. Due to the scarcity
of bandwidth resources on WMNs,
WMNs, it is essential to compare
the bandwidth overhead incurred by different protocols. The
latency of join and leave events reflects
reflects the responsiveness
responsiveness of
the protocol to the upper layer applications.

E. Protocol Overhead
I ) Computation overhead: Figure 3(a) and3(b) show the
1)
computation overhead due to symmetric encryptions and
asymmetric encryptions at the source node and a randomly
selected member node for different protocols for experiments
(10kbps) and the group
packets/second (lOkbps)
with the data rate of 5 packetslsecond
dynamics of 5 joins and 5 leaves per minute. For the symmetric
encryption overhead, we observe that WSOM-LK has much
higher overhead than the other protocols, especially at the
source node. This is because WSOM-LK requires per data
packet computation overhead that is linear to the number of
children of the node. For the asymmetric encryption overhead,
we observe that W-LKH has a significantly higher number of
asymmetric encryptions performed at the source node than the
other protocols. The reason is that with W-LKH the source
node handles all the join and leave requests, each of which
requires asymmetric encryption operations, whereas for the
WSOM based protocols, the join and leave requests are hanfashion, hence the required asymmetric
dled in a distributed fashion,
encryptions are shared by all member nodes. Since asymmetric
encryptions are computationally intensive operations, the high
number of asymmetric encryptions at the source node in WLKH can potentially introduce a performance bottleneck at the
source, especially at high group dynamics. It also allows for
potential DoS attacks that aim at exhausting the computation
resource at the source node.
The bandwidth overhead and latency for
2) The
for join
join and leave
operations: Figure 3(c), 3(d) and Figure 3(e), 3(f) show the
bandwidth overhead and latency for the join and leave events,
respectively, for different levels of group dynamics. From
these graphs, we can make the following observations. First,
for all proposed protocols both the bandwidth overhead and

C.
C. Reliable Key Transport
Transport

We now demonstrate the importance of reliable key transport for secure multicast protocols on WMNs, which motivates
our design for W-LKH. Figure 2(a) and 2(b) show the delivery
and decryption ratio of LKH and B-LKH for different levels
levels
figures, while
of group dynamics. As we can see from these figures,
both LKH and B-LKH maintain a similar delivery ratio as
the case without any security mechanism, these two protocols
have very poor decryption ratios. The poor decryption ratio for
LKH is due to two reasons: the high probability of key loss
on the wireless network and the frequent rekeying operations
which exacerbate the key loss problem. B-LKH improves
the decryption ratio over LKH by reducing the frequency of
the rekey operations, however,
however, since the key loss problem is
solved, the end result is still not satisfactory.
satisfactory. If we can
not solved,
further solve the key loss problem, as we will see in the
performance results of W-LKH below, the decryption ratio
turns out to be dramatically improved. Therefore, based on
these observations, we conclude that reliable key delivery is
essential for secure multicast protocols on WMNs.

D. Protocol Performance
Performance and Robustness
Figure 2(c), 2(d) and Figure 2(e), 2(f) show the delivery and
decryption ratio for all the proposed protocols for different
respectively. We oblevels of data rate and group dynamics, respectively.
serve that for all the data rates and group dynamics examined,
all the proposed secure multicast protocols can maintain a
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latency remain stable for different levels of group dynamics.
Second, the WSOM based schemes have much less bandwidth
bandwidth
overhead and latency than the W-LKH protocol for both join
join
and leave events. This is the manifestation of
of the difference between the centralized and decentralized membership management principles. With decentralized
decentralized membership management,
as in the case of
of WSOM, only local messages are required for
joins
joins and leaves. On the other hand, centralized membership
management schemes, as W-LKH, require global messages

between the joining or leaving node to the data source.
3) Peak bandwidth: Figure 4(a), 4(b), 4(c), and 4(d) show
the bandwidth consumed at the source node over time for all
the different protocols for a simulation run with the data rate
of 5 packetslsecond
packets/second (IOkbps)
(lOkbps) and the group dynamics of
of 5
of
join and leave events per minute. From these graphs, we can
join
see that WSOM based protocols consume relatively stable
bandwidth at the source over time, while W-LKH exhibits
of bandwidth consumption. The reason for
high variability of
9
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with higher data rate, if the application can tolerate partial
secrecy, then WSOM-GK
loss for forward and backward data secrecy,
is the best choice. Otherwise, neither W-LKH and WSOM-GK
can be used; the best choice is still WSOM-HK.

the high peak bandwidth requirement of W-LKH is two-folds.
First, the size of the rekey packets in W-LKH is relatively
large, since potentially many keys on the key tree needs to
be updated for a rekey event. Second, all the join and leave
requests require communication with the source in W-LKH.
W-LKH.
Since high bandwidth peaks can cause packet loss and possible
congestions on the network, W-LKH is less favorable
favorable than the
WSOM based protocols in this respect.
4)
4) Total
Total bandwidth overhead: In order to get an overview
of all the bandwidth overhead introduced by the secure multicast protocol, Figure 4(e) and 4(f) show the average total
bandwidth overhead due to the secure multicast protocol for
an entire simulation session for different data rates and group
respectively.
dynamics, respectively.
We first observe that the bandwidth overhead for both
WSOM-LK and WSOM-HK increase linearly with the data
rate. However,
However, the increase rate for WSOM-HK is significantly
smaller than WSOM-LK, which makes the bandwidth overhead of WSOM-HK comparable to other protocols while the
significantly higher.
bandwidth overhead of WSOM-LK are significantly
This difference shows the effectiveness of the hop key in
WSOM-HK for reducing the bandwidth overhead. From Figure 4(f), we can also observe that for all the protocols, the total
bandwidth overhead remains quite stable for different levels
of group dynamics.

CONCLUSION
IX. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we explored different design choices for
solving the problem of secure multicast service for WMNs.
We proposed several secure multicast protocols, and compared
them both analytically and experimentally. We discussed the
trade-offs among different design choices and suggested the
best design choices for different application scenarios. Future
work includes extending the proposed protocols to multisource group communications, and experimenting with the
protocols in a wireless mesh testbed.
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